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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case comes to the Court pursuant to Utah R. App. Procedure 41 certification
by Judge Dee V. Benson of the United States District Court, District of Utah. This Court
accepted certification on January 23, 2009 and jurisdiction is appropriate under Utah
Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(l) (West 2008).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A certified question from the federal district court does not present us with a
decision to affirm or reverse a lower court's decision; as such, traditional standards of
review do not apply. On certification, we answer the legal questions presented without
resolving the underlying dispute."1
Question Certified for Determination
This Court accepted certification of the following question:
"Whether provision of lower limits for underinsured motorist coverage than for liability
coverage, properly complies with former Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-305(9)(b) and
31A-22-305(9)(g) (currently codified under Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305.3)."
Relevant Statutes. Rules and Constitutional Provisions
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(9):
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1,2001, the limits of
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured

1

Egbert v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2007 UT 64, ^ 7, 167 P.3d 1058.
1

motorist coverage limits available2 by the insurer under the insured's motor
vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount
by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:
(i) waives the higher coverage.

(g)(i) [i]n conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after
January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall
disclose . . . an explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist
coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts
up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.3
The complete statute is attached as Addendum "A."
Statement of the Case
Historical Changes To Policies Issued by State Farm Over the Course of 24 Years.
During their 24 year relationship with the Iversons State Farm issued new policy
numbers at crucial points, such as: termination, time-out-of-force, changes in vehicles,
and a complete substitution of one Policy Form for a new Policy Form. (Addendum "B"
Table Policy Chronology). State Farm first issued a policy of insurance to Carter and
Glenada Iverson in 1981. (R. 0201). State Farm's first policy provided coverage for a
1981 Pontiac Firebird and was numbered #479 7848-804-4. In 1990 State Farm State

2

State Farm has not argued and it is undisputed that higher amounts were available
under the policy.
3

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (West 2001)(currently codified under Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-22-305.3)(emphasis added).
2

Farm "replaced" policy #479 7848-804-44 and issued policy #479 7848-804-44A which
governed a 1984 Dodge Van. (R. 0201).
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From 1991 through 2005, State Farm replaced the prior policy on numerous
occasions and ultimately issued new policy numbers ranging from #479 7848-804-44A to
#479 7848-804-44F. (R. 201, 228, Addendum "B" Table Policy Chronology). In 1997
the Iversons experienced a "Time Out of Force," resulting in State Farm issuing #479
7848-804-44B. Then, in 1997, State Farm terminated the policy. (R. 202, 228, 230).
When reinstating coverage, State Farm issued policy #479 7848-804-44C, replacing the
prior policy #479 7848-804-44B.
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Similarly, whenever the Iversons acquired a new vehicle, State Farm's
documentation shows that they issued new coverage. State Farm paperwork treated the
policy as a 'replacement' (R. 201, 204), and issued a new policy number to coincide with
the new coverage for the new vehicle (R. 201 [1984 Dodge Van para 2]; R. 203, 232
[1995 Chevy Van]; R. 204 [2001 PT Cruiser]).4 For example, in October 1997, State
Farm issued policy #479 7848-804-44D for the newly acquired 1995 Chevy Van,
replacing the previous coverage under policy #479 7848-804-44C. (R. 203, 232).
From the beginning of their relationship, State Farm told the Iversons that their
policy "consists of [declarations], any
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corporate representative Tammy Chase (R. 304), in August 2001 State Farm replaced the
Iverson's Policy Booklet Form 9844.3 (R. 355-377) with State Farm's new Policy
4

State Farm may attempt to characterize the multiple change in vehicles over the
years as nothing more than providing coverage for a 'replacement' vehicle. In the
Federal Court action, State Farm cited their renewal notices and argued that these were
mere replacement vehicles. However, the notices lack any indication that State Farm
simply added the vehicle onto an "existing policy." (R. 202).
4

Booklet Form 9844.4 (R. 379-408). Reflecting this change to basic terms, definitions and
conditions to the Iverson's contracted coverage, State Farm replaced policy #479
7848-804-44D with #479 7848-804-44E. (R. 304). The effective date for Utah Code
Ann. §31A-22-305, January 1, 2001, precedes State Farm's issuance of new terms,
definitions and conditions in August of 2001. However, after issuing a new policy with
altered terms, conditions and definitions for the Iverson's policy, State Farm did not
obtain a written waiver of UIM coverage equal to liability limits. (R. 204).
The Policy Form issued by State Farm is an "agreement" by and between State
Farm and their insured. According to State Farm: "We, the State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, agree to insure you according to the terms of this policy
based: 1. on your payment of premium for the coverages you chose, and 2. in reliance on
your statements in these declarations." (R. 382, 352). The Policy continues: "You agree,
by acceptance of this policy that: 1. the statements in these declarations are your
statements and are true; and 2. we insure you on the basis your statements are true; and 3.
this policy contains all of the agreements between you and us or any of our agents." (R.
382, 352)
Further, under the Policy Form, the "terms of the policy may only be changed or
waived only by: (1) an 'endorsement'... or, (2) the revision of policy form to give
broader coverage." (R. 404)(emphasis added). However, the new Policy Form narrowed
the coverages and substantially altered the terms and conditions. First, the new policy
provisions altered the definition of "bodily injury," expressly eliminating coverage for
5

emotional distress where no physical injury occurred. (R. 300, and Addendum "C" Table
Policy Language). Other substantive changes in coverage, changes which narrowed the
coverage available included: (1) redefining the nature of coverage for rental vehicles used
by the insured (R. 356, 381 Addendum "C" Table Policy Language); (2) removed no-fault
coverage "while operating or occupying a motorcycle" (R. 363, 389, Addendum "C"
Table Policy Language); (3) eliminated ability of insured to recover attorney fees when
electing arbitration for dispute over no-fault benefits (R. 389, Addendum "C" Table
Policy Language); and, (4) gave State Farm right to rely on mailing as sufficient proof of
notice. (R. 405, Addendum "C" Table Policy Language).
The new policy also altered the definition of 'newly acquired car.' (R. 356,
Addendum "C" Table Policy Language). Under the original terms of the contract
between State Farm and the Iversons, State Farm would provide coverage for a new
vehicle if "(1) [the Iversons] tell us about it within 30 days after its delivery to you; (2) if
you or your spouse has more than one of our car policies, tell us which one is to apply;
and, (3) pay us any added amount due." (Id.)(emphasis added).
Under the new terms, State Farm would provide coverage for a new vehicle only if
the Iversons "(1) ask u$ to insure it within 30 days after its delivery to you; and (2) pay
us any added amount due." (R. 380)(emphasis added). Under the new provisions, the
Iversons had to ask State Farm for insurance coverage. State Farm could then decide
whether or not to issue coverage and whether a new policy would be issued. Under the

6

terms of this new policy, State Farm subsequently supplied a new policy of insurance for
a 2001 PT Cruiser.
In 2003 the Iversons acquired a PT Cruiser. They asked State Farm to provide
coverage for the vehicle. (R. 204,257). State Farm issued policy #479 7848-804-44F for
the coverage on the PT Cruiser, replacing the prior policy #479 7848-804-44E. (R. 204,
259). State Farm sent a Declarations Page for the PT Cruiser to the Iversons. Under
"IMPORTANT MESSAGES" State Farm informed the Iversons that policy #479
7848-804-44F "Replaced policy number 4797848-44E." (R. 204, 259).
bMgORTANTM{^&<^
Your policy ccnabta of this declarations page, the policy booklet - form 9844,4, and any endorsements that apply, including
those issues to you with any subsequent renewal rofcce,
Replaced pclicy number 4797848-44E.
„__

_
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State Farm's Declarations Page further juxtaposes and differentiates between
'replacement' insurance coverage as opposed to 'renewal' insurance coverage by telling
the insured that future coverage under the new policy will be governed by any
endorsements which apply to "subsequent renewals." (Id.)(emphasis added). At the time
State Farm replaced #479 7848-804-44E with policy #479 7848-804-44F they did not
obtain a waiver for UIM coverage in an amount less than the liability policy limits.
Over the course of 24 years State Farm issued new policies when the Iversons
purchased a new vehicle, experienced a "Time Out of Force" or when State Farm issued a
new policy altogether. State Farm's consistent and habitual issuance of a new policy
number following a Time Out of Force, Termination/Reinstatement of coverage,

7

replacing policies to cover new vehicles and alteration of the contractual terms and
agreement through a new Policy Booklet Form demonstrate the creation of a new policy,
not a renewal of the same continuous and uninterrupted coverage.
State Farm's Corporate Representative Confirmed Policy Changes,
State Farm's designated corporate representative, Tammy Chase, testified that
underwriting involves a two-step process.
Q. So it's a two-step process to go through underwriting.
A. Right.
Q. The first step is eligibility?
A. Uh-huh.
Q.Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And the second step is the rating of the risk.
A. Yes.
(R. 205, 238-239, 320-321).
Q. All right. So we've described two steps in the underwriting process,
eligibility and then the second step is rating of placement. Are there other
steps beyond those?
A. No.
(R. 205, 241, 320-321).
In the second step of underwriting, determining the rating, State Farm considers
the type of vehicle, the coverages, deductibles, where the car is used, the territory, the
classification of the car, how the car is used (commuter/business/pleasure etc.) and the
age of the operator. (R. 205, 240). State Farm also admits that there is a difference in
rating, the second step of underwriting, for a 1981 Firebird as opposed to a 2001 PT

8

Cruiser. "Q. So there's a change in underwriting between a 1981 Firebird and a 2003 PT
Cruiser; is that accurate? A. There's a change in rating." (Id. at 23:11-14).5
State Farm will likely point out that insureds derive an alleged 'benefit' by
characterizing old policies as 'the same' policy even when significant rating changes
result in issuance of new policy numbers. Specifically, State Farm suggests that insureds
receive a lower premium rate simply by calling the policy 'the same.' However, contrary
to a supposed 'benefit' to the insured in maintaining the same policy, Tammy Chase
admits that there is no guarantee of continuing discounts and that, in any case, State Farm
must follow the rates it has on file. (R. 205, 244-245). Ms. Chase agreed that there
might, in fact, be no benefit whatsoever to the insured.
Q. Is it always the case that if State Farm writes a new policy, the premium,
the cost of that policy is going to be greater than if it were simply renewed?
A. No.
Q. So the benefit that you're talking about doesn't always accompany the
renewal.
A. It's possible that it wouldn't, that it could be the same.
(See, 244).
Additionally, the change in policy numbers from policy to policy is important in
determining what coverages and declarations exist for the policy. State Farm admits that
the issuance of a new policy number is used to "identify which declarations page would
be in effect." (R. 205, 245). Furthermore, any change in principal drivers would trigger
both an eligibility and a rating review. (R. 206, 246-247). For example, a change from a
5

State Farm also admitted that the 'class changes' to the Iverson's insurance
constituted rating changes. (R. 205, 228, 242-243).
9

married to an unmarried male driver would reflect a change in the second step of
underwriting, the rating of the policy.
Q. The underwriting risks change with age; Is that right?
A. Yes. This was an unmarried male, age 25 to 29, so that corresponds
with our class 3.
Q. So itfs a change in the underwriting on the policy as well as a change in
principal driver.
A. It's a change in the rating of the policy. The classification is part of the
rate.
Q. And then the very next page, deposition exhibit no. 3, Page number
1524, we see another change reflected in the principal driver. It says there
are no male or unmarried female drivers under age 25. Is that accurate
what iVe just said?
A. Yes. That's what that says.
Q. And again that would affect the second step of the underwriting
process, the rating.
A. It would impact the rating, the pricing of the policy, yes.
(R. 206,248-250). Here, State Farm's policy underwent just such a change when the
principal driver changed from Carter Iverson to his son, Rex Iverson in 1997-1998. (R.
88, 92) and the premium increased from $162.90 to $350.02.
Finally, State Farm admits that even when there is no change at all to the policy
number, there may still be material changes to the policy and that material changes are
those which "impact the pricing of the policy." (R. 206).
Q. You would agree that the change in principal driver is — in fact, I think
you already agreed when we were talking earlier that the changing of
principal driver is a material change that's going to affect the premiums and
risk involved in the policy; Isn't that true?
A. It would impact the pricing of that policy.
Q. So it's not an immaterial change.
A. Even just changing a driver, though, would not create even a change to
that change code.
Q. But if it changed in matters with respect to the cost of the policy?
10

A. To the pricing of the policy, yes.
Q. So it's a change that materially affects the policy then; Is that true?
A. Depending on the age of the driver, the driving record, it may or
may not impact the pricing. It could have potential.
Q. So it could be a material change.
A. Right.
Q. In fact, with the change of the driver in this case, it did, with the change
in principal driver, it did change the costs, didn't it? I guess that would be
reflected by the documents, wouldn't it?
A. Yes.
(R. 206, 254-255).
In this case, State Farm documents reflect that the change in principal drivers did,
in fact, alter the pricing of the policy and hence were material to the policy. In February
of 1997 the principal driver was aged 50 or older and the premium was $162.90. (R. 207,
232-234,). Yet, one year later, the principal driver was an unmarried male age 25-29 and
the premium was more than double the year before at $350.02. (R. 207). Further, the
change in vehicles also altered the pricing and, according to Ms. Chase, therefore
constitutes a material change in the insurance policy. In February of 2003 the total
premium for the 1995 Chevy Van was $277.20. (R. 207, 261). Yet, after replacing #479
7848-804-44E, the policy covering the Chevy Van, with #479 7848-804-44F, the policy
covering the PT Cruiser, the pricing jumped to $379.00. (R. 207).
From 1981 through 2005 State Farm insured four different vehicles under differing
policy numbers, two different principal drivers and issued new policy numbers on three
different occasions following a termination, "Time Out of Force," or rewriting of the
terms and conditions in the Policy Booklet Form. (Addendum "C" Table Policy
11

Language). State Farm admits that the insurance issued to Carter and Glenada Iverson
changed frequently:
Q. Has gone through numerous changes. That's true?
A. That's correct.
Q. It's had different principal drivers.
A. Correct.
Q. It's had principal drivers who differ in terms of a risk assessment? I'm
speaking to the 23 to 25 year age range and unmarried. That's correct?
A. Okay.
Q. It's had four different vehicles on it.
A. Correct.
Q. The premiums have differed for those vehicles.
A. Correct.
Q. The entire policy number itself has not remained the same over the
course of the policy?
A. I would say that the policy number has and that the change code has
differed.
Q. I understand the distinction but if you read the policy number as a
whole, it changes over the course of time.... That last number on the policy
changes, letter.
A. The last letter, the change code can change, yes.6
(R. 252-253)
State Farm produced no evidence that they obtained a written waiver from from Carter or
Glenada Iverson allowing the UIM coverage to be less than the liability coverage.
In July of 2005, Carter and Glenada Iverson were killed in a head-on collision
while driving the 2001 Chrysler PT Cruiser. Joni Iverson, as personal representative of
the heirs and estate Carter and Glenada, requested that State Farm provide UIM coverage
6

Ms. Chase's testimony does equivocate that this is simply a 'change code' but the
fact remains that the policy number, as a whole, changes to reflect the issuance of
coverage for a vehicle not previously covered or to identify reinstatement/recovery from
a time-out-of-force, temporary suspension of coverage or issuance of a new policy.
12

in an amount equal to the liability policy limits of $50,000/$ 100,000. State Farm refused
to provide the higher limits. (R. 152). State Farm argues that, despite the numerous
changes and passage of 24 years, the policy of insurance covering the 1981 Firebird is the
'same' policy of insurance, simply a 'renewal/ covering the 2001 PT Cruiser.
Summary of the Argument
State Farm characterizes a policy of insurance written in 1981 and covering a 1981
Firebird as the 'same' policy issued in 2003 and covering a 2001 PT Cruiser. Besides the
obvious fact that neither the PT Cruiser nor the policy of insurance existed at the time
State Farm wrote coverage in 1981, the myriad changes and circumstances demonstrate
that the Iverson's coverage changed materially after the legislature enacted a written
waiver requirement.
State Farm's Policy Did Not Exist on January 1,2001.
The policy of insurance governing the 2001 PT Cruiser did not exist until 2003
when State Farm issued Policy #479 7848-804-44F to replace the prior policy #479
7848-804-44E. Additionally, even the preceding Policy #479 7848-804-44E did not exist
until August 2001 when State Farm issued a new Policy Form. Because the policy of
insurance covering the Iversons did not exist prior to January 1, 2001, Utah Code
31A-22-3 09(b) mandates that State Farm obtain a written waiver of UIM coverage equal
to the liability coverage. State Farm never secured a written waiver from the Iversons.
Accordingly, the UIM coverage must equal the liability coverage, in this case $50,000 per
person and $100,000 per occurrence.
13

State Farm's Policy Is Not A 'Renewal' of Previously Existing Coverage.
The sole exception for obtaining written waivers from insureds is in the case of a
renewal. However, a policy of insurance written for the first time in 2003 cannot be
considered 'renewal' insurance. State Farm believes that a policy originally written in
1981, providing coverage for a 1981 Firebird, is the same policy governing a 2001 PT
Cruiser, written in 2003 and in force at the time of a collision in 2005. State Farm takes
this position in order to argue that the policy was simply 'renewed9 over the years.
State Farm takes an extreme position that, despite four changes in automobiles,
two changes in primary operator and at least two occasions where the coverage was
considered to be "Time Out of Force" the policy of insurance is the 'same' and therefore
simply a 'renewal.' Indeed, State Farm replaced the entire policy terms, conditions,
declarations and coverage in August of 2001 and issued a new number reflecting those
changes as well. Yet, State Farm cannot explain why their own written materials sent to
the insureds indicate that State Farm was 'replacing,' not renewing, a policy which had
lapsed or on which the vehicles had been changed.
In light of these facts, State Farm did not simply 'renew' a previously valid policy.
Rather, State Farm replaced the policy in existence, with a new policy, as reflected by the
policy number itself. When a light bulb bums out, the light bulb is replaced, meaning
that a new lightbulb is substituted for the one which no longer functions or exists. State
Farm's position, however, seems to be that so long as the power company remains the
same, the light bulb never changes.
14

L STATE FARM'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A WRITTEN WAIVER WHEN
ISSUING NEW COVERAGE AFTER 2001 REQUIRES THAT UIM LIMITS
EQUAL THE LIABILITY LIMITS.
For all new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, underinsured motorist
coverage equals the liability coverage unless the insured affirmatively waives, in writing,
the right to matching UIM coverage.7
The operative statute provided in relevant part:
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1,2001, the limits of
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured
motorist coverage limits available8 by the insurer under the insured's motor
vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount
by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:
(i) waives the higher coverage.9
State Farm issued Policy #479 7848-804-44F covering the PT Cruiser in April of
2003. State Farm "replaced" former Policy #479 7848-804-44E with #479
7848-804-44F. (R. 327).
No evidence of record indicates that State Farm obtained the written waivers after
'replacing' the prior policy as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305. Accordingly,

7

Utah Code does allow an insurer to issue UIM for amounts less than liability
coverage, but only so long as that amount is the maximum offered by the insurer under
the policy.
8

State Farm has not argued and it is undisputed that higher amounts were available
under the policy.
9

Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305.3(2)(b)(emphasis added). The statutory provision
written in 2000 and in effect as of 2001 was numbered § 31A-22-305(9)(b) but was
renumbered in 2001 without substantive change.
15
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the UIM coverage under Policy #479 7848-804-44F must equal the liability coverage on
the Iverson PT Cruiser, $50,000/$ 100,000.
The legislature provided a single exception to the requirement that insureds waive
UIM in writing - existing policies which were renewed did not require a written waiver
under the 2000 legislation. For renewal policies in existence on January 1, 2001, the
insurer only needed to provide a notice to the insured explaining UIM coverage.
However, the exception only applies to policies existing on January 1, 2001. State Farm
relies on this exception in attempting to show compliance with the statutory
requirements.
(g)(i) [i]n conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after
January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall
disclose . . . an explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist
coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts
up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.10
Unfortunately, the policy controlling coverage over the PT Cruiser did not exist on
January 1, 2001 and, therefore, any renewal notifications fail to meet the strict legislative
requirements.11 As demonstrated by the undisputed facts in this case, State Farm Policy
#479 7848-804-44F "replaced" the prior policy #479 7848-804-44E in April 2003.

10

Id. (emphasis added).

11

The New Oxford American Dictionary (Second Edition) defines existing as "in
existence or operation at the time under consideration."
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Accordingly, #479 7848-804-44 which insured the PT Cruiser did not exist until April of
2003, a full two years after the statute went into effect.
Further, the preceding policy, State Farm Policy #479 7848-804-44E did not exist
until August of 2001. State Farm wrote policy number #479 7848-804-44E in order to
establish the new terms, definitions and conditions contained in Policy Booklet Form
9844.4. The only policy of insurance "existing on [January 1, 2001]" was Policy #479
7848-804-44D. State Farm Policy #479 7848-804-44D was subject to the prior terms,
conditions and definitions contained in Policy Booklet Form 9844.3. State Farm wrote a
new policy by issuing #479 7848-804-44E and incorporating the new Policy Booklet
Form. Because State Farm Policy #479 7848-804-44F did not exist on January 1, 2001, it
cannot be considered a 'renewal' policy.
State Farm told insureds in the declaration under "IMPORTANT MESSAGES"
that policy #479 7848-804-44F "Replaced policy number 4797848-44E." (See, 204,
258-259). If the policy did not previously exist and was written as a replacement policy,
then it can be nothing other than a new policy. By contrast, State Farm does not tell the
Iversons that the PT Cruiser replaced a Chevy Van. Holding that the policy issued in
1982 governing a Firebird is the same policy of insurance governing a 2001 PT Cruiser
and issued in 2003 grants State Farm the power to wholly dictate the characterization of
its insurance without deference to the legislative requirements or the undisputed facts.
When an insurer writes insurance for new circumstances, or writes an insurance
contract to alter the terms of the original contract, the insurer has created a 'new' policy,
17

not a renewal policy, and must therefore obtain the statutorily mandated written waiver
from the insured regarding the amount of accepted UIM coverage.12 An insurance policy
written to provide coverage on a new vehicle, a new principal driver or to alter the
substantive terms of the agreement is not a 'renewal,9 but rather a replacement policy as
demonstrated by State Farm's identification of a new policy number and express
characterization of the policy as "replacement."13
Renewal is commonly defined as "the action of extending the period of validity of
a license, subscription, or contract."14 In other words, 'renewal' assumes that the original
contract was in existence and simply "came up for renewal."15 By contrast, replace is
defined as "take the place of: provide or find a substitute for (something that is broken,
old, or inoperative)."16 When writing the contract for purposes of a new vehicle, State
Farm's own records and documents describe the coverage provided to the Iversons as
'replacement' coverage, not renewal coverage. Because the insurance contract between
the Iversons and State Farm was written on several occasions, it simply cannot be said
that the contract that existed between the Iversons and State Farm in 1981 is the same
continuous renewal contract of insurance covering their collision in 2005.

12

Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305.3(2)(b) (West 2008).

13

See, Statement of Facts, suprafflf2,21.

14

New Oxford American Dictionary (Second Edition)

15

Id

16

Id.
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II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES THAT STATE
FARM'S POLICY BE CONSIDERED NEW, NOT A RENEWAL.
When interpreting statutory insurance requirements the primary goal is "to evince
the true intent and purpose of the Legislature... by first looking to the statute's plain
language, and giving effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous."17
The plain language approach also requires that this Court must "presume that the
legislature used each word in a statute advisedly and we give effect to each term
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."18 In matters of insurance coverage,
Utah Courts give deference to the public policy and compensatory goals of insurance by
requiring that any exceptions to coverage be strictly and narrowly construed. UIM
"statutes are remedial in nature, requiring that they be liberally construed in favor of
coverage, with strict and narrow construction given to exclusions."19
The plain language of the statute requires waivers for "new policies written on or
after January 1, 2001." However, in order to avoid the statutory requirements of
providing higher UIM coverage, State Farm reads words into the statute which do not
exist. State Farm reads the statute as "for all new policies wttderwritten." No such
language exists in the statute and this Court would go well beyond the plain language of
the statute in construing it to include such language. The legislature carefully chose that

17

Li v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 2006 UT 80 f 9, 150 P.3d 471.

18

A/, at H 21.

19

General Security Indent. Co. ofArizona v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109 % 13, 158 R3d

1121.
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the policy need only be 'written,' not underwritten, in order to require insurers provide
higher UIM coverage or obtain a waiver. Because the legislature chose the word
'written' over 'underwritten,' State Farm's position that this is not a new policy quickly
loses viability.
Additionally, the plain language of Utah's statute provides a single narrow
exception to obtaining a waiver from an insured. Under the statute, renewal policies
existing at the time of January 1, 2001 only needed to provide an additional notice to
insureds regarding UIM coverage. No policy of insurance existed which governed the
PT Cruiser until April of 2003. State Farm's approach would read out of existence the
'existing at the time' language of Utah's statute. Courts must "avoid interpretations that
will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative."20 Despite this firmly
entrenched principle of statutory construction, State Farm attempts to read out the
'existing at the time' phrase in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305.3.
In order to fit within the renewal exception, State Farm's interpretation expands
renewal to include substitution, reinstatement, replacement or any number of other forms
a new policy might take, so long as some vague "internal operation" of the insurance
company considered the policy as a renewal. It is highly unlikely that the legislature
intended to leave it to the discretion of individual insurance companies to brand their
policies as 'new' or 'renewal' based solely on internal operations. In briefing to the
Federal District Court, State Farm cited authority allegedly supporting their broad
20

Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, % 9, 173 P.3d 166.
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interpretation of the statute. However, that authority cannot guide this Court due to the
disparate differences in statutory language addressed in those decisions.
For example, Millet v. Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance interpreted a much
different statute. There, the statute addressed increased UIM requirements "when a
renewal, reinstatement, substitute, or amended policy is issued to the same named insured
by the same insurer or any of its affiliates."21 Clearly, this statute is much broader than
Utah's - the Utah legislature chose to allow an exception to written waivers only for
renewals, not for 'reinstatements, substitutes, amendments.' Not surprisingly, the Millet
court found in favor of the insurance company under the Louisiana statute. Indeed, each
authority relied upon by State Farm similarly dealt with such broad statutory language.22
Utah law requires that the construction and application of the 'renewal' exception
to written waiver be done narrowly, giving full effect to each word used, including the
"then existing" language. Because Policy #479 7848-804-44F did not exist until 2003, it
21

Millet v. Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance, 887 So.2d 603, 605 (La. Ct. App.)
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See, Gasch v. Harris, 808 So.2d 1260 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002)(UIM "coverage or suet
higher uninsured motorist limits need not be provided in or supplemental to any other
policy which renews, extends, changes, supersedes, or replaces an existing policy with
the same bodily injury liability limits when an insured or lessee had rejected the
coverage." Florida Statutes Ann. § 627.727 (West 2008)); and, Dodd v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
99 P.3d 1219, 1222, n. 4 (Okla. Civ. App. 204)(no written waiver required for UIM "in or
supplemental to any renewal, reinstatement, substitute, amended or replacement
policy."); and, Johnson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 817 P.2d 841, 843, n. 2 (Wash
1991)("such coverage shall not be included in any supplemental or renewal policy unless
a named insured or spouse subsequently requests such coverage in writing."); and, Wells
v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exchange, 185 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970)
(UIM coverage "need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy" but also
refusing to address issue under a constitutional ex post facto analysis).
21

cannot be considered a 'renewal' policy. The Utah legislature, unlike other states, chose
to narrowly define the circumstances under which an insurer may simply given notice to
the insured regarding UIM benefits. Other states broadly defined the notice
circumstances as including any supplemental, replacement, or superseding policies and
did not even specify that those policies needed to be "then existing."23 If the state
legislature desired to allow replacement polices to be subject to the simple notice
procedure, the legislature could have adopted language identical to that in other state
systems. Utah requires that insurers obtain a written waiver for all new policies written
after January 1, 2001 and the policy covering the PT Cruiser, being written in 2003, is
such a policy. Because Policy #479 7848-804-44F was written in 2003, State Farm must
provide coverage equal to the liability limits of $50,000/$ 100,00.
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND OTHER STATE COURTS REQUIRE THAT STATE
FARM PROVIDE UIM COVERAGE EQUAL TO THE LIABILITY COVERAGE.
A. Legislative History and the Underlying Public Policy Require Any
Ambiguity Between 'Renewal' and 'New' Construed In Favor of Coverage
Equaling the Liability Limits.
"When interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent
and purpose."24 "If we find the provision ambiguous, we then seek guidancefromthe
legislative history and relevant policy considerations."25 Even if the statute contained
some ambiguity sufficient to raise a question whether or not State Farm's policy is a
23

Id
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Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, If 9, 173 P.3d 166.

25

Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21,1J8, 70 P.3d 85.
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"renewal" policy or a "new" policy, the legislative history and public policy undermine
any finding that State Farm can escape providing hiring limits under the renewal
exception.
The public policy underlying the legislative mandate of UIM limits equal to, at the
very least, the liability limits was intended to eliminate confiision and provide the greatest
coverage possible for insureds. In a 2007 Utah Court of Appeals case, the opinion
undertook a review of the legislative history and policy giving rise to the requirement that
insurers such as State Farm obtain a written waiver for lower UIM limits. "The
legislative policy reflected [by Uninsured/Underinsured coverage] is to ensure that
consumers make fully informed decisions about UM coverage, not to give insurers an
out."26 The Utah Court of Appeals recognized that the statutory changes in 2000 cured a
legislative concern: consumers lacked adequate information and understanding regarding
their underinsured and uninsured coverages. According to Representative Koehn:
When we buy insurance for our cars, and we purchase the amount that we can
refer to as the "liability amount," ... consumers generally don't understand that
that's a package that you buy, and they believe that when they're buying that
coverage, that's taking care of themselves or their family. That's not the case....
What this bill does is says, when you're purchasing insurance ... the underinsured
coverage will be the same as the liability coverage you have, unless you choose
not to take that. But what [the bill] presumes, is that the levels will be the same, so
that the consumer gets what they believe they're buying, or they understand what
they're buying, and ... it provides a way that if you don't want that, then you can

26

General Security Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109 ^f 9, n. 4
(construing Utah's uninsured provisions by reference to legislative debate regarding
Utah's underinsured statutes).
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sign a waiver saying "I recognize Fm taking a lesser amount of underinsured
coverage."27
When the Iversons purchased insurance in April of 2003 for their 2001 PT Cruiser, they
purchased liability coverage in an amount of $50,000/$ 100,000.
State Farm ignores the legislative finding that insureds must be protected by
mandating the higher limits absent a written acceptance of lower limits because the
insureds simply didn't know what they were getting when purchasing insurance. State
Farm should not be allowed to so easily skirt legislative intent by portraying a policy
written after this legislative amendment as a renewal based on nothing more than
reference to State Farm's own internal procedures. "To allow a statutory exemption on
the basis of the form of the transaction and the documentation involved - matters solely
within the control of the insurer - is to allow the application of the statute to be controlled
by the insurer."28
Underinsured and uninsured statutes:
are designed to protect insureds by providing compensation to those who
are injured or killed by uninsured motorists or other financially
irresponsible motorists. Such statutes are remedial in nature, requiring that
they be liberally construed in favor of coverage, with strict and narrow
construction given to exclusions. UM statutes are designed for the benefit
of insureds and not insurers. They are adopted to benefit the insured
motorist, and are not intended to relieve ... insurers of primary

27

Aiatlll.

28

Folstad v Farmers Insurance, 210 N. W.2d 238, 240 (Minn. 1973)(refusing to
allow insurer to characterize policy as 'renewal' where changes in driver and insured
vehicles occur).
24

responsibility ... or to benefit them in any way.29
State Farm did not cite a single decision in the Federal briefing where an insurance
coverage lapsed or experienced a "Time Out of Force," and was reissued and replaced,
but was still considered as a 'renewal' policy. Further, State Farm cites no authority
wherein the insurer expressly defined and identified the new policy as "replacing" a prior
policy and, thereafter, the policy was considered a renewal. Finally, and as noted above,
those few decisions cited by State Farm are distinguishable based on broad statutory
language which excepted the policy from mandatory higher UIM coverage. In light of
the Utah legislature's expressed public policy to 'protect insureds' and the very narrow
use of language allowing insurers to escape a written waiver, State Farm's position that
they need not obtain a written waiver for lapsed coverage and replacement policies fails.
Other courts examining the issue readily conclude that a replacement policy is the
equivalent of a 'new' policy. In Whaley v. Allstate Ins, Co,, the court held that "the Policy
was not a 'renewal' but a new or replacement policy on October 9, 1981, when Mr.
Whaley substituted a 1981 Chevette for a 1980 Chevette."30 Similarly, in Withrow v.
Pickard, the court recognized "that the addition of a vehicle to an existing policy
constitutes a new policy distinct from the original... We also agree with Withrow that a
new policy was created when he added a third vehicle to his original policy."31 Here,
29

General Security Indent, Co. of Arizona v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109 ^ 13, 158 P.3d
1121 (citation and quotation omitted).

30

Whaley v. Allstate Ins, Co,, 595 F.Supp. 1023, 1026 (D.C. Del. 1984).

31

Withrow v, Pickard, 905 P.2d 800, 803 (Okla. 1995).
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State Farm's own documents indicate that the insurance policies have replaced each other
on several occasions when bringing coverage to a new vehicle. Thefinalpolicy
governing the PT Cruiser did not exist prior to April of 2003 and, because it cannot be a
renewal if it did not previously exist, it must therefore be considered a new policy under
Utah law.
Because a 'renewal' is to be strictly and narrowly construed in light of public
policy considerations requiring a broad construction advancing coverage for benefit of
insureds, other jurisdictions reject contentions that would take a recently issued policy
outside of increased coverage. For instance, in Beauchamp v. Southwestern Nat'I Ins.
Co., the court ruled that a similar statutory scheme is "strictly limited to true renewals of
existing insurance policies, that is, situations where such renewals are made without
effecting a material change or departure from the provisions of the original policy."32
Beauchamp concluded that, as a necessary result of the public policy in favor of
coverage, the addition of a 1974 Jeep took the coverage outside a 'true renewal' and
imposed statutory requirements for UIM. Relying on Beauchamp, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals paid heed to the "admonition to read [renewal exception] narrowly."33
In May, the court found that a reduction in liability coverage amount took the insurance
coverage outside the scope of a mere 'renewal.'34 Adopting State Farm's attempt to
32

Beauchamp v. Southwestern Nat'I Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 673, 676 (Okla. 1987).

33

May v. National Union Fire Insurance Company, 84 F.3d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir.

1996).
34

Id.
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characterize the 24 year old policy as a mere renewal would frustrate the important policy
considerations that prompted the Utah legislature to abolish the written rejection
exception.
The express public policy of the State of Utah is that UIM statutes are designed for
the benefit of insureds and not insurers. Mandatory UIM equal to the liability limits,
absent written waiver, is adopted to benefit the insured motorist, and should not be
construed to relieve insurers of primary responsibility or to benefit them in any way. Any
construction of the statutes must be done liberally in favor of coverage, with strict and
narrow construction given to exclusions. Accordingly, State Farm cannot dictate the
basis on which policies will be considered 'new' or 'renewal' based on their own internal
procedures and classification. An appropriate construction of the statute requires that the
replacement policy covering the PT Cruiser be considered a new policy of insurance
which did not exist prior to its creation in April of 2003. Accordingly, because it was a
new policy and because State Farm did not obtain a written waiver, the UIM coverage
must equal the liability limits.
IV. VEHICLE CHANGES, A CHANGE IN THE POLICY ITSELF AND
STATE FARM'S ADMISSION TO MATERIAL CHANGES SHOW THE
COVERAGE FOR THE IVERSONS TO BE NEW, NOT RENEWAL.
When significant changes occur to a policy, courts find that the subsequent policy
is new and not a mere renewal. In Arms v. State Farm Mut Auto, Ins. Co., the court
confronted an issue strikingly similar to that in this case. The insured had purchased
several vehicles over the life of the relationship with his insurer, State Farm. In Arms
27

state statutory law imposed "the duty to offer to its insured the option to purchase
additional uninsured motorist coverage."35 Similar to this case, the statutory scheme
provided that "where the policy in issue is a renewal policy and the option to purchase
additional coverage has been articulated by the insurer when issuing the original policy,
no subsequent offer is required by the statute."36 Just as in this case, State Farm "seized
upon" the renewal exception.37 Accordingly, the court found that the issue, as here,
"reduces itself to whether or not the policy in effect at the time of the collision was a
renewal of prior coverage."38
Also there as here, the insured had replaced his vehicle on three separate
occasions. State Farm contended that the issuance of a policy for each vehicle was
"merely a renewal of the initial coverage; therefore, the duty to offer the option to
plaintiff did not attach beyond the offer made in connection with the purportedly original
policy."39 The court rejected this argument and agreed with the insured that the
subsequent policies were "replacement and, therefore, [the insured] should have been
offered the option of increasing his uninsured motorist limits." The outcome should be
no different in this case. State Farm themselves characterized the policies as
'replacement6 and the changes reflect the fact that their policies with the Iversons were
35

Arms v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 360, 361 (Del. Super. 1984)
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Id. at 362.
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not mere renewals. Therefore, under Utah's statutory scheme, State Farm should have
obtained a written waiver electing to maintain the lower UIM coverage.
Similarly, a Hawaii court considered even a few changes, such as a change to the
named insured and a newly acquired vehicle, to be 'material.' Based on public policy,
removing and replacing the named insured and adding a vehicle, "taken together,
constituted a material change to the pre-existing policy... and, therefore, Allstate was
required to make a new offer of UM/UIM coverage."40 The multitude of changes in this
case involved changes in principal driver, vehicles, and even issuance of a new Policy
Booklet Form. Certainly these changes present material changes sufficient to trigger the
requirement that State Farm obtain a written waiver because the policy is no longer a
'renewal9 of a prior policy.
The numerous changes over the 24 years of providing insurance to the Iversons
represent material and significant changes both cumulatively and standing on their own.
However, State Farm's corporate representative admitted that the change in principal
drivers was a material change as reflected by the change in pricing. State Farm's
corporate representative also admitted that changes in pricing reflect material changes to
the policy. If the change "impact[s] the pricing, [i]t could have potential. Q: So it could
be a material change? A: Right. Q:... [T]hat would be reflected by the documents,
wouldn't it? A: Yes." (R. 235, 254-255).

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d 490 (Hawaii 2000)
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The documents reflect that the change in vehicles altered the pricing and, by Ms.
Chase's definition of material, therefore constitutes a material change in the insurance. In
February of 2003 the total premium for the 1995 Chevy Van was $277.20. (R. 261). Yet,
after replacing #479 7848-804-44E, the policy covering the Chevy Van, with #479
7848-804-44F, the policy covering the PT Cruiser, the pricing jumped to $379.00. (R.
119). Despite these admittedly material changes, State Farm failed to obtain a written
waiver for the lower UIM limits.
State Farm wrote two new policies following the 2001 legislation. First, State
Farm wrote a new policy to reflect the narrowing of coverage offered under their new
Policy Booklet Form. Second, State Farm wrote a new policy to provide coverage for the
2001 PT Cruiser. State Farm must admit the materiality of both the alteration of the basic
agreement and contract for insurance as well as the issuance of coverage for the PT
Cruiser. If either of these events were immaterial,' State Farm would not issue coverage
at different premiums to reflect the change in risk insured or cause the policy number to
change. In short, both events constitute material and significant departuresfromthe prior
policy as reflected by State Farm's own handling of each event, namely issuance of a new
policy to reflect the event as well as an alteration to the pricing of the policy.
The coverage at issue in this case came about as a result of issuing a policy of
insurance in April 2003. State Farm offers no evidence that the insureds waived the
higher limits. Accordingly, it is appropriate to require that the UIM coverage in this case
equal the liability limits of $50,000/$ 100,000.
30

Conclusion
Because State Farm's own documentation characterizes Policy #479
7848-804-44F as a 'replacement' policy, because that policy did not exist on January 1,
2001 and because the policy changed in several material respects, State Farm must obtain
a written waiver for the higher UIM limits. State Farm offers no real explanation as to
how a policy covering a 2001 PT Cruiser and written for the first time in April 2003 can
be characterized as a 'renewal' a policy "then existing" in January of 2001. The sum of
changes affected the pricing on the policy and involved rating aspects of underwriting as
admitted by Ms. Chase.
Utah law requires insurers to provide UIM limits equivalent to the liability limits
on a policy unless a written waiver is obtained from the insured. There is only a single
and very narrow exception to the mandate that UIM limits equal liability limits - that
exception only applies to a policy of insurance existing on January 1, 2001. Because the
policy at issue came into existence in April of 2003, State Farm must demonstrate they
obtained a waiver of higher UIM from the Iversons. State Farm offers no written waiver.
Further, the undisputed facts in this case show that the policy covering the Iversons in
2005 for their 2001 PT Cruiser was not a mere renewal of the same policy governing the
Iversons 1981 Firebird and written in 1981. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully requests
that State Farm be required to provide the UIM equaling the liability limits in this case as
mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.
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Addendum A
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
PART III. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
Copyright © 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
31A-22-305

Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes:
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or
guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, including those
who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or
owned by a self-insurer; and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or
death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes:
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered
under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required by Section 31A-22-304;
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured to the extent of the deficiency;
(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately
caused by the vehicle operator;
(c) a vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an accident is
disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days or, beginning with the effective date of this act, continues to be disputed for more than 60 days; or
(d) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability insurer of the vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction;
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(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured only to the
extent that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty association or fund.
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(b) provides
coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness,
disease, or death.
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured' s motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:
(i) waives the higher coverage;
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage; and
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.

(c) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less than
the minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Section 31A-22-304.
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that issuer of
the uninsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests different
uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer.
(e) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January
1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the
same medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in
amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability
policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(4) (a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured may reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer that

UTST§31A-22-305
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provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a).
(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that includes
a reasonable explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage.
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer.
(b) (i) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in the
business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural persons by motor
vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation services for their
students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used for that purpose, by purchase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage
of at least $25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.
(ii) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an injured
covered person.
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage:
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers'
Compensation Act;
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation
insurance; and
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered
person has been made whole.
(d) As used in this Subsection (4):
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 63-30- 2.
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la-102.
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered person or
the vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person must show the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence consisting
of more than the covered person's testimony.
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident.
(b) (i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a covered person as
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defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii).
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is entitled to
the highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle
that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member.
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the
covered person is occupying.
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against
the other.
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be
primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections
(l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage.
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or using a motor
vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim
is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle
covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or
(7), a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered
person.
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover uninsured motorist benefits
under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered person" as
defined in Subsection (1):
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle;
and
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that
is not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative.
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a
vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability
policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and general
damages.
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include:
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(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same
policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2).
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(c)
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death.
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy,
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:
(i) waives the higher coverage;
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; and
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less
than $10,000 for one person in any one accident and at least $20,000 for two or
more persons in any one accident.
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that issuer of
the underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests different underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer.
(e) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described in Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or operator of
an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8). Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability coverage of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to, combined with, or
stacked upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of the underinsured
motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage available to the injured person.
(f) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection
31A-22-302(l)(a).
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage
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and when it would be applicable.
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer,
(g) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January
1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the
same medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in
amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry underinsured motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available
by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using a motor
vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured, a
resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the motor vehicle is
described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in this Subsection (10), a covered person injured in a vehicle
described in a policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not elect
to collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle
insurance policy under which he is a named insured.
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or
more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident.
(ii) Subsection (10)(b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered person as
defined under Subsection (10)(d)(i)(B).
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall
be primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage.
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage:
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers'
Compensation Act;
(ii) may not be subrograted by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;
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(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation
insurance; and
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered
person has been made whole.
(d) (i) Each of the following persons may also recover underinsured motorist
coverage benefits under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered
person" as defined under Subsection (1):
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an underinsured motor
vehicle; or
(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is
not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person,
the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative.
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a secondary source of coverage.
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (10)(d)(i)(B) is entitled
to the highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any one
vehicle that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member.
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the
covered person is occupying.
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the
other.
(e) A covered injured person is not barred against making subsequent elections
if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(11) A claim may not be brought by a covered person against a motor vehicle underinsured motorist policy more than three years after the date of the last liability policy payment.
(12) (a) Within five business days after notification in a manner specified by
the department that all liability insurers have tendered their liability policy
limits, the underinsured carrier shall either:
(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may have against the
person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered by the liability carrier.
(b) If neither option is exercised under Subsection (12)(a), the subrogation
claim is deemed to be waived by the underinsured carrier.
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History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, §
157; 1987, ch. 162, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 4; 1992, ch. 132, § 3; 1993, ch. 271, § 2;
1994, ch. 316, § 15; 1995, ch. 294, § 1; 1996, ch. 240, § 12; 1997, ch. 375, § 14;
1999, ch. 158, § 1; 2000, ch. 188, § 1; 2001, ch. 59, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. — T h e 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, designated Subsection (6)(a) and added Subsections (6)(b) and (6)(c); substituted "Subsection (6)
or ( 7 ) " for "Subsection (7)(b)" in the second sentence of Subsection (7)(a); added
Subsections (10)(b)(ii) through (c)(v) and made related changes; redesignated
former Subsection (10)(c) as (10)(d) and deleted the first sentence authorizing
elections of underinsured motorist coverage under specified circumstances; and
made stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 35A, Chapter 3"
for "Title 35, Chapter 1" in Subsection (4)(b)(ii) and added "(10)" in Subsections
(10)(b)(ii) and (10)(c)(iii).
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapter 2"
for "Title 35A, Chapter 3" in Subsection (4)(b)((ii).
The 1999 amendment, effective March 18, 1999, added Subsection (2)(c), redesignating former Subsection (2)(c) as (2)(d), and made related and stylistic changes
in the section.
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added Subsections (3)(b) to (3)(e),
(4)(a)(ii), (4)(c)(ii) to (4)(c)(iv), (9)(b) to (9)(d), (9)(f)(ii), (10)(c), and
(11), and made related changes; deleted "For new policies or contracts written
after January 1, 1993" from the beginning of Subsection (9)(f)(i); rewrote Subsection (9)(g), revising the provisions for notice and disclosure; and made stylistic
changes.
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, corrected a subsection reference
in Subsection (10)(b)(ii) and added Subsection ( 1 2 ) .
Compiler's Notes. — T h e phrase "the effective date of this act" in Subsection
(2)(c) means March 18, 1999, the effective date of Laws 1999, ch. 158, which added
that subsection.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Construction with other statutes.
The Workers' Compensation Act is not the exclusive remedy for injured employees
who seek to recover from someone who is not their employer, or an officer, agent,
or employee of the employer, and these employees do have viable claims against

Addendum B

Change
Prompting New
Policy Number

Policy Number

Date

Record Citation

First Policy: State
Farm Issued
Coverage For 1981
Firebird

#479 7848-804-44

August 1981

R. 201

I

New Vehicle: State
Farm Replaced
Prior Policy For
1984 Dodge Van

#479 7848-804-44A

August 1990

R. 201

I

Time Out of Force: #479 7848-804-44B
State Farm Issued
New Policy Number

March 1997

227-228; 350-351

I

Termination: Prior
Policy "Terminated"
State Farm Issues
This Policy as
Replacement

#479 7848-804-44C

August 1997

R. 202, 227-228;
202, 229-230

|

New Vehicle: State
Farm Issued Policy
To Cover 1995
Chevy Van

#479 7848-804-44D

October 1997

R. 203, 85-95; 93

I

Changed Policy
Form: State Farm
Changed Their
Agreement/Policy
Form

#479 7848-804-44E

August 2001

303, 355, 379, 86

I

New Vehicle: State
Farm Issued
Coverage for 2001
PT Cruiser
"Replaced" Prior
Policy

#479 7848-804-44F

April 2003

204, 357, 359

I

Addendum C

Old Policy
9844.3

New Policy
9844.4

Non-owned
car

Non-owned car does not Include a car:
1. Which is not in the lawful possession of the
person operating it; or
2. Which has been operated by, rented by or
in the possession of an insured during any part
of each of the preceding 21 days; or
3. Operated by an insured who has operated
or rented any car otherwise qualifying as a
non-owned car during any part of more than
45 days in the 365 days preceding the date of
the accident or loss.
(R. 356).

Non-owned car does not include a:
1. rented car while it is used in connection with
the insured's employment or business; or
2. car which has been operated or rented by or
in the possession of an insured during any part
of each of the last 21 or more consecutive days.
If the insured is an insured under one or more
other car policies issued by us, the 21 day limit
is increased by an additional 21 days for each
such additional policy.
A Non-owned car must be a car in lawful
possession of the person operating.
(R.381).

No-Fault

excluded coverage "while operating or
occupying a motor vehicle owned by you, your
spouse or any relative if it is not insured for
this coverage under this policy." (R. 363).
Paragraph 4

excludes coverage "while operating or
occupying a motorcycle." (R. 389). Paragraph
3

Provision

goes on to exclude "coverage under this policy
for bodily injury to any person who is injured.
a. While occupying a motor vehicle which is
(1) owned by or furnished for the regular use of
you or any relative; and
(2) not insured for no-fault coverage under this
policy.
b. When struck by a motor vehicle which is
(1) owned by the injured person, and
(2) not insured for no-fault coverage under this
policy.

(Id.).
No-Fault
Settlement of
Loss

If the insured elects to pursue arbitration the
policy now eliminates attorney fees. "An
insured is not entitled to attorney fees if the
i insured elects arbitration as provided for by this
policy." This language is missing in policy
number 8443. (R. 389).

I

Provision

Old Policy
9844.3

New Policy
9844.4

Newly
acquired car

Newly Acquired Car - means a car newly
owned by you or your spouse if it:
1. Replaces your car; or
2. Is an added car and:
a. If it is a private passenger car, we
insure all other private passenger cars, or
b. If it is other than a private
passenger car, we insure all cars

Newly Acquired Car - means a replacement car
or an additional car.

owned by you and your spouse on the date of
its delivery to you or your spouse;
but only if you or your spouse:
1. Tell us about it within 30 days after its
delivery to you or your spouse and
2. If you or your spouse has more than one of
our car policies tell us which one is to apply;
and
3. Pay us any added amount due.
(R. 356).

Replacement Car- means a car newly owned by
or newly leased to you or your spouse that
replaces your car. This policy will only provide
coverage for the replacement car if you or your
spouse:
1. Ask us to insure it within 30 days after its
delivery to you or your spouse; and
2. Pay us any added amount due.
Additional car - means an added car newly
owned by or newly leased to you or your
spouse this policy will only provide coverage for
the additional car you:
1. It is a private passenger car and we insure
all other private passenger cars; or
2. It is other than a private passenger car and
we insure all cars
owned by or leased to you or your spouse on
the date of its delivery to you or your spouse.
This policy provides coverage for the additional
car only until the earlier of:
1. 12:01 a.m. standard time at the address
shown on the declarations page on the 31st day
after the delivery of the car to you or your
spouse; or
2. The effective date and time of a policy issued
by us or any other company that describes the
car on its declarations page.
You or your spouse may apply for a policy that
will provide coverage beyond the 30th day for
the additional car. Such policy will be issued
only if both the applicant and the vehicle are
eligible for coverage of the time of application.
If the newly acquired car is not otherwise
afforded comprehensive or collision coverage
by this or any other policy, this policy will
provide the comprehensive or collision
coverage not otherwise provided for the newly
acquired car. If such coverage is provided by
this paragraph it will apply only until 12:01 a.m.
standard Time at the address shown on the
declarations page on the sixth day after the
delivery of the car to you or your spouse. Any
comprehensive or collision coverage provided
by this paragraph is subject to a deductible of
$500.
(R. 380).

Provision

Conditions

Old Policy
9844.3

New Policy
9844.4

Right of State Farm to cancel. Policy number
9844.4 includes new language that "the mailing
of the notice shall be sufficient proof of
notice." (R. 405).

Provision

Old Policy
9844.3

New Policy
9844.4

Bodily Injury

Means "bodily injury to a person and sickness,
disease or death which results from it." (R.
356)

Means "physical bodily injury to a person and
sickness, disease or death which results from it.
A person does not sustain bodily injury if that
person suffers emotional distress in the
absence of physical bodily injury." (R. 380).

